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Abstract 
Economic theory of criminal law consists of normative and positive parts.  Normative 
economic theory, which began with writings by Beccaria and Bentham, aims to 
recommend an ideal criminal punishment scheme.  Positive economic theory, which 
appeared later in writings by Holmes and Posner, aims to justify and to better understand 
the criminal law rules that exist.  Since the purpose of criminal law is to deter socially 
undesirable conduct, economic theory, which emphasizes incentives, would appear to be 
an important perspective from which to examine criminal law. 
Positive economic theory, applied to substantive criminal law, seeks to explain and to 
justify criminal law doctrine in economic terms – that is, in terms that emphasize the 
incentive effects created by the law.  The positive economic theory of criminal law 
literature can be divided into three phases: classical deterrence theory, neoclassical 
deterrence, and modern synthesis.  The modern synthesis provides a rationale for 
fundamental criminal law doctrines, and also more puzzling portions of the law such as 
the  doctrines of intent and necessity. Positive economic theory also provides a rationale 
for the allocation of enforcement responsibilities. 
 
Keywords: substantive criminal law, economics of criminal law, economic theory of 
criminal law, criminal intent, optimal deterrence, classical deterrence, complete 
deterrence, internalization of harm, error cost model, public choice theory of criminal 
law, necessity doctrine 
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Introduction 
 
Criminal law consists of substantive and procedural parts. Substantive law consists of the 
rules that govern and control behavior – specifically the rules enjoining types of conduct, 
such as robbery, that violate the criminal law. Procedural law consists of the rules that 
establish the methods by which the state enforces criminal law, such as constraints on 
prosecutorial behavior, and rules governing the burdens and standards of proof.1  
Substantive rules mostly constrain the conduct of private individuals.  Procedural rules, 
by contrast, tend to regulate the conduct of agencies and institutions in the criminal law 
enforcement process.  This essay focuses on substantive criminal law.  
Economic theory of criminal law consists of normative and positive parts.  Normative 
economic theory attempts to prescribe optimal rules for regulating socially undesirable 
conduct.  Positive economic theory seeks to provide a rationale for existing criminal law 
doctrines and institutional features of the criminal law enforcement process.  This essay 
emphasizes positive economic theory.  However, much of the literature has advanced 
through analyses that are in part normative and in part positive. 
The literature on the economics of criminal law is vast. This essay does not attempt to 
cover every detail, and instead focuses on the broad framework of progress in the 
literature.  It provides an overview of the major arguments. 
One of the great issues here, as in any other area of law and economics, is ensuring that 
economic analysis addresses questions that are of central concern to the law. The 
assessment of criminal intent, for example, is an important concern of criminal law, and 
yet economics still treats this as a subject too unwieldly to capture in models.  In 
recognition of this tendency in economic analysis to avoid some matters at the heart of 
the law, this essay attempts to integrate economic analysis with major criminal law 
doctrines.2 
This essay provides a review of the economics of substantive criminal law. It divides the 
literature into three phases: classical deterrence theory, neoclassical deterrence, and 
modern synthesis. The modern synthesis offers a positive account of fundamental 
doctrines (e.g., common law crimes), and also rationale for more puzzling doctrines such 
as intent and necessity in criminal law. The essay closes with some observations, again in 
the vein of positive economic analysis, on the allocation of enforcement responsibility. 
 
Substantive Criminal Law 
                                                 
1 On the economics of criminal procedure, see, e.g., Posner (1973), Easterbrook (1983), Adelstein (1981), 
Miceli (1991). 
2 For a discussion of criminal law and economics that addresses these issues and behavioral economics as 
well, see Harel (2012). 
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The economics of substantive criminal law is largely contained in two models, one due 
(mostly) to Bentham (1781) and other due to Becker (1968). Bentham asserted that the 
purpose of criminal punishment is to completely deter offensive conduct. To completely 
deter, the state should set the criminal penalty at a level that eliminates the prospect of 
gain to the offender. Bentham was not the first to offer this commonsense proposition; 
Beccaria (1764) proposed it before him. However, Bentham explored the deterrence 
principle in greater depth than authors who came before him. 
The notion that punishment should take the profit out of crime sounds like common 
sense, but it also leads to recommendations that fall outside of common practice.  
Bentham followed his theory to its logical conclusions on punishment, which led him to 
recommendations that would be condemned in modern society as cruel and extreme.3 
 
Classical Deterrence Theory 
 
Bentham’s classical deterrence theory suggests that the expected penalty must be at least 
as large as the gain the offender gets from committing the offense.4 The expected penalty 
is simply the probability of punishment multiplied by the penalty. Thus, if the expected 
penalty must be no less than the gain to the offender, in order to completely deter, then 
the expected penalty and the offender gain must have the relationship: Gain ≤ 
Probability×Penalty. This implies, in turn, that the penalty must be at least as great as the 
offender’s gain divided by the probability of punishment.  
If the punishment is not imposed until some period after the crime has been committed, 
then the offender’s discounting over time must be incorporated into the punishment 
calculus to maintain deterrence. Let the offender’s discount rate, δ, be defined as the rate 
that determines the subjective value today of a dollar to be received next year as 
$1/(1+δ). If the punishment will not be imposed until n years after the crime is 
committed, the penalty must satisfy the condition: Penalty ≥ (1+δ)n (Gain/Probability).  
This suggests that classical deterrence requires multiplying the gain of the criminal by a 
multiplier based on the criminal’s discount rate, the delay period, and the probability of 
punishment: 
                                                 
3 For a discussion, see Hylton (2005, at 98).  On the social acceptance of harsh punishment, see Schkade et 
al. (2000). 
4 I have set aside the issue of marginal deterrence, that is, the concern that penalties should be bounded 
from above to ensure that the offender does not have an incentive to engage in more harmful conduct.  The 
marginal deterrence problem was noted by Bentham (781).  For modern discussions, see Stigler (1970), 
Mookherjee and Png (1994).  I have also set aside other reasons why it may be optimal to have an upper 
limit on the penalty.  One (see Andreoni, 1991) is that a high penalty may reduce the probability of 
conviction.  Another (see Hylton, 1996) is that a high penalty may induce victims to take too little 
precaution.  For an exploration of implications of victim precaution see Rappaport (2018). 
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Probabilities of punishment are not readily available. One study notes that less than half 
of violent crimes are reported to police and less than half of those reported are cleared by 
police, suggesting a maximum probability of punishment of 25 percent for violent 
crimes.5 For property crimes, the rates are roughly one-third and one-fifth respectively, 
suggesting an upper bound of 7 percent.6 A study of punishment for environmental 
crimes suggests that for such crimes the likelihood of punishment is extremely low, on 
the order of 8 in one million.7   
As for delay, the average time between sentencing and the death penalty is  running at 15 
years.8 Of course, this statistic is incomplete even as a sample measure of the delay 
between the commission and punishment of a crime. A murderer, unless released on bail, 
will have been incarcerated for the period of trial and throughout the period up to the 
imposition of the death penalty. If any time in confinement, however short, is treated as 
punishment, then the imposition of punishment occurs at the moment of apprehension. 
However, it is unlikely that a murderer would view a small period of time in jail or prison 
as consummation of the punishment. Moreover, there is quite a difference between 
imposition of confinement and imposition of the death penalty.  
To simplify matters, suppose there is no death penalty, and the offender is sentenced to 
twenty years in prison. When, precisely, is the punishment imposed? The answer is that 
the punishment is imposed over the entire time-span of the sentence. The penalty is the 
discounted value of the disutility of the twenty-year sentence.9 Thus, even in a case 
where there is no delay before the initiation of punishment, a punishment such as 
incarceration involves some feature of delay in imposition.  
Obviously, it simplifies matters a bit too much to treat delay as simply a matter of the 
time between commission of the crime and imposition of the punishment. The 
punishment itself may not be instantaneous. Another problem is that the punishment may 
come in qualitatively different forms, as in the case of incarceration followed by the 
death penalty. 
                                                 
5 German Lopez, The Great Majority of Violent Crime in America goes Unsolved, VOX (Mar. 1, 2017, 
3:10pm), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/3/1/14777612/trump-crime-certainty-severity.  
6 Id.  See also, Shavell at 1232 (noting that violent crimes and theft in the U.S. often go unreported (26 
percent of home thefts and 67 percent of vehicle thefts), and therefore statistical percentages in crime 
reports must be taken as “upper bounds for the probability of imposition of sanctions.”)  
7 Lynch et al. (2016). 
8 Time on Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/time-death-row  
9 Polinsky and Shavell (1999). 
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As far as the time-period between apprehension and sentencing, one study reports that the 
median number of days between arrest and disposition (for all crimes) of the trial is 126 
in the U.S., with another 52 days between disposition and sentencing.10 In some 
jurisdictions, the median delay between arrest and sentencing is over one year.11 
Most criminal defendants have low levels of education,12 low impulse control,13 and a 
tendency to discount the future heavily.14  McAdams and Ulen (2009) survey the 
literature on the imperfect rationality of offenders. In effect, the typical criminal has a 
high discount rate on future utility.  The combination of high discount rates coupled with 
delay suggests that criminal penalties should be enhanced to take these factors into 
account.15 
Table 1 below computes complete deterrence penalties for different discount factors and 
punishment probabilities, on the assumption that the offender’s gain is $100, and that the 
delay between commission and punishment is only one year. For the realistic cases of 
both a low probability of apprehension and high discount factor, this quite preliminary 
analysis suggests that multipliers that raise the penalty by an order of magnitude are 
plausible. 
 
Offender Gain = $100 Punishment Probability (P) 
Discount Rate (δ) P = .5 P = .2 P = .1 
δ = .09 $218 $545 $1090 
δ  = .18 $236 $590 $1180 
δ  = .30 $260 $650 $1300 
 
Table 1: Classical Deterrence Penalties for Offender Gain of $100. 
 
Since imprisonment is a common form of punishment, the existence of substantial 
discount factors implies the deterrent value of prison may be less than appears to the eye 
at first glance. If criminal offenders discount the future heavily, then a doubling of a ten-
                                                 
10 Listokin (2007, at 139). 
11 Id. 
12 Caroline Wolf Harlow, Education and Correctional Populations, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, (Mar. 
15, 2003), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf (finding 68 percent of state prison inmates report 
having less than a high school education.)  
13 Nagin and Pogarsky (2004).  On rationality and impulse control, see Cooter (1991). 
14 Nagin and Pogarsky (2004).  
15 Listokin, (2007). 
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year prison sentence may not have a significant deterrent effect.16 To increase the 
deterrent effect of incarceration, the state would have to consider increasing the severity 
of incarceration in the earlier portion of the period rather than extending the period of 
incarceration. Heavy discounting implies a policy favoring the frontloading of 
punishment. Such implications probably led Bentham to support extreme forms of 
punishment, under a policy in which the punishment would be characteristic of the 
crime.17 Bentham’s ideal punishments would associate a severe loss with either the 
perceived gain or the physical mechanism immediately associated with commission of 
the crime. Thus, the thief would likely suffer amputation, and the rapist castration, under 
Bentham’s punishment scheme.18 
In the extreme case where the offender discounts the future so heavily that a backloaded 
punishment, such as a prison sentence, cannot deter his conduct, should the state simply 
give up on the notion of punishment? Even if the offender cannot be deterred by such a 
punishment, there is still an incapacitation basis for imprisonment. Once an offender has 
committed an offense punishable by some definable penalty, he has revealed that the gain 
he perceives from commission of the offense is greater than the expected penalty. Such 
an offender is therefore likely to commit the offense again, unless incapacitated. Hence, 
the observation that some criminals are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of prison is 
often inadequate as an argument against imprisonment or other forms of incapacitation. 
Yet another problem for classical deterrence theory was suggested by an interesting 
thought experiment of Immanuel Kant (1797). Kant asked what society should do in its 
last moments, before being dissolved, with the remaining murderers in prison? His 
answer was that the state should execute them on that last day, lest society share in the 
guilt for their crimes. If deterrence were the sole basis for punishment, there would be no 
justification for punishment on the final day in Kant’s thought experiment. Indeed, if the 
final day of society occurs on a certain date, the case for punishment for deterrence 
purposes unravels. The day before the final day, punishment would not be justifiable 
because every rational actor knows that the prospect of deterrence thereby gained is not 
credible, and on the day before the day before, the same expectation holds, ad infinitum.  
Hence, classical deterrence theory implodes. 
But this reasoning is unpersuasive, on many grounds. First, it is inconsistent with the 
ample empirical evidence of discounting and impulsiveness on the part of criminals.19 
The infinite-regression disproof of classical deterrence assumes hyper-rationality on the 
part of actors, and the existence of a certain and foreseeable final date for society. None 
of this is true of the real world.  
 
                                                 
16 This is an implication of discounting, see Polinsky and Shavell (1999). 
17 See, e.g., Hylton, 2005a, at 98 
18 Id. 
19 Nagin and Pogarsky (2004). 
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Neoclassical Deterrence Theory 
 
Becker’s neoclassical deterrence theory holds that the goal of punishment should be to 
internalize the social harm from a criminal offense. Internalization maximizes social 
welfare by guaranteeing that a criminal offender takes an offensive action only when the 
gain he experiences is greater than the harm he imposes on society. 
Under Becker’s theory, the expected value of the penalty should be equal to the harm 
imposed on society by the offender (Probability×Penalty = Harm),20 which implies that 
the optimal penalty is the social harm divided by the probability of punishment. If the 
penalty will not be imposed until one year after the crime is committed (or planned) then 
in order to achieve optimal deterrence the penalty must equal (1+ δ)Harm/Probability.  
The internalization policy is preferable to complete deterrence if the activity of offenders 
is potentially efficient, in the sense some instances the offender’s conduct actually 
increases society’s welfare. If no instances exist where the offender’s gain is greater than 
the social harm, then Becker’s framework would imply complete deterrence. In other 
words, Becker’s framework incorporates the complete deterrence policy as a special case. 
It should be clear that the foregoing statements concerning the relationship between delay 
and the penalty multiplier apply just as well to the neoclassical policy. However, there is 
a crucial difference. In the complete deterrence framework, the penalty multiplier 
represents a lower bound on punishment. In the internalization model, by contrast, the 
penalty multiplier must be precise; if it is too low, then the penalty under-internalizes, 
leading to too many offenses. Conversely, if the multiplier is too high, then it over-
internalizes, leading to too few offenses. 
The implication that there could be such a thing as “too little crime” is a soft spot in 
Becker’s model. How, some scholars have asked, could there be too little fraud, robbery, 
or murder?21 One answer, implied by the Becker model, is no, there could not be too little 
murder. The state should completely deter murder because the gain to the murderer is less 
than the loss to society. But this answer only pushes the question ahead slightly. What 
should society do about cases where the gain to the murderer is greater than the loss to 
society? 
 
Modern Synthesis 
 
                                                 
20 This may seem to assume that the harm will be imposed with probability one.  However, the harm 
component can be interpreted as expected harm without requiring any changes in the discussion. 
21 Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d. 841, 847 (Easterbrook, J., “[t]he optimal amount of fraud is zero.”). 
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The answer to this question was not suggested until Calabresi and Melamed (1972) 
offered an alternative to the Becker model’s reconciliation of the complete deterrence and 
internalization policies. Calabresi and Melamed did not frame their article as an 
exploration of criminal law; it is mostly a discussion of civil law. However, in later 
passages and footnotes, the authors sketch some of the implications of their analysis for 
criminal law. Recognizing that Calabresi and Melamed had not fully explained the 
implications of their analysis for criminal law, Posner (1985) extended the Calabresi-
Melamed framework to offer a positive theory of criminal law.22 
Calabresi and Melamed created two categories for legal rules: property rules and liability 
rules. Property rules prohibit specified conduct. Liability rules do not prohibit conduct, 
and only require the offender to pay damages to the victim (or a fine to the state). 
Property rules implement the complete deterrence policy, while liability rules internalize 
social harm. Calabresi and Melamed argued that property rules are preferable where 
transaction costs are low or where (consistent with Becker) the underlying activity is 
unambiguously socially undesirable because the gain to offenders could not exceed the 
social harm. Property rules are therefore of two types: (Type 1) some aim to prevent 
offenders from bypassing the market where transaction costs are low, and others (Type 2) 
aim to eradicate socially undesirable activities where transaction costs are high. 
Posner (1985), building on the Calabresi-Melamed framework, explains that much of 
criminal law consists of Type 1 property rules. A robbery, for example, is a forced 
transaction (“market bypass”) that could otherwise occur through the market. Even if the 
robber’s utility from the transaction exceeds the loss to his victim, society has an interest 
in encouraging such transactions to occur consensually through the market, rather than 
through force or fraud.23   
Hylton (2005) presents a model that formalizes Posner’s argument and reconciles the 
Becker and Posner approaches to criminal law.24 The model generates the Becker and 
Posner approaches as special cases. As a general matter, wherever the cost of transacting 
through the market is less than the incremental cost of law enforcement, society should 
encourage transacting through the market, by adopting the complete deterrence policy.  
Second, even if transaction costs are high, complete deterrence is the optimal policy 
when the offender’s activity is unambiguously harmful to society (as in the Becker 
model). 
Curry and Doyle (2016) extend the framework of Hylton (2005) in a formal model of law 
enforcement that incorporates market transactions.25 Importantly, Curry and Doyle show 
                                                 
22 Before Posner’s positive theory of criminal law, the only work providing a positive economic theory 
(actually, utilitarian) of criminal law was the chapter on criminal law in Holmes (1881).  
23 The market-bypass theory is a simple economic explanation for prohibiting theft.  Other theories are 
surprisingly complicated, see Hasen and McAdams (1997). 
24 Specifically, Hylton (2005) presents a simplified version of the Becker optimization problem that 
incorporates the option for the offender to purchase in the market rather than steal. 
25 Philip A. Curry and Matthew Doyle, Integrating Market Alternatives Into the Economic Theory of 
Optimal Deterrence, Economic Inquiry Vol. 54, No. 4, October 2016, 1873–1883. 
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that maximization of a social welfare function in which offenders have the option to 
transact through the market is equivalent to minimizing an objective function consisting 
of the costs of crime. In particular, the cost-minimization objective function they derive 
does not include the benefits that the offender receives from crime, which is quite 
different from the objective function analyzed by Becker (1968).26 
Curry and Doyle do not recommend the complete deterrence approach as in Posner 
(1985) and in Hylton (2005). The reason is that their model allows for the cost of 
punishment to be positive. Given a positive cost of inflicting punishment, the incremental 
deterrence gain from increasing the punishment must be balanced against the incremental 
cost of imposing punishment. However, if the cost of punishment is negligible (as with 
monetary fines) or slight relative to deterrence gain, as implicitly assumed in Posner and 
in Hylton, then the complete deterrence penalties would also be recommended by Curry 
and Doyle’s model. 
The diagram below summarizes the modern synthesis suggested by Posner and developed 
in Hylton (2005). In the first cell, the offender’s activity may be efficient. For example, 
the harm may be an externality such as pollution, which is the byproduct of producing 
some useful product. Transaction costs are high because it would be difficult for a large 
number of pollution victims to enforce a right to clean air. The incentive to free ride 
would make it unlikely that any single victim would sue to enjoin the polluter. In this 
category, criminal law should adopt the internalization policy, because the underlying 
activity is (at least potentially) efficient. Penalties should seek to internalize the social 
harm from pollution rather than to completely deter the offender’s production activity. 
In the second cell (upper right), the offender’s activity is unambiguously inefficient. The 
activity could be some form of intentional imposition of harm, such as the production of 
infant milk formula knowingly contaminated with a harmful chemical, such as 
melamine.27 Alternatively, the activity could be some form of reckless conduct, such as 
driving in the wrong direction on highways. The optimal policy here is complete 
deterrence, which requires a penalty that eliminates the prospect of gain on the part of the 
offender. 
In the lower-left cell, transaction costs are low and the underlying activity is efficient, at 
least in some significant set of transactions. One set of examples includes temporary 
takings of property to protect more valuable types of property. Consider, for example, a 
mobile home seller who drives across the property of the victim, without the victim’s 
permission, in order to avoid the burden of having to follow an alternative path that is 
more time-consuming to travel (Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 
                                                 
26 That the benefits from crime to offenders are included in Becker’s social welfare function has been a 
source of controversy (Stigler, 1970).  Dau-Schmidt (1990) addresses the controversy by arguing that 
criminal law serves in part to alter the preferences of offenders. 
27 See, e.g., Gossner, 2009, at 1803 (A major food safety incident in China was made public in September 
2008. Kidney and urinary tract effects, including kidney stones, affected about 300,000 Chinese infants and 
young children, with six reported deaths. Melamine had been deliberately added at milk-collecting stations 
to diluted raw milk ostensibly to boost its protein content.) 
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1997)). Alternatively, suppose a wealthy person, to protect his Rolls Royce from damage 
caused by bad weather, parks his car in the victim’s garage without getting the victim’s 
permission. The optimal policy is again complete deterrence because the offender can 
easily gain the consent of the victim for a transaction that imposes harm. The victim will 
consent if the compensation offered by the injurer is at least as great as the harm. 
The final cell includes activities for which the transaction costs are low, and are never 
efficient. Most common law crimes such as murder fall within this cell. A consensual 
transaction in which the victim accepts the harm in exchange for compensation is 
unlikely, mostly because the injurer would be unable to offer a sufficient sum to fully 
compensate the victim for the harm. 
 
Deterrence Theory 
Modern Synthesis 
 
Maximum Offender Gain  
Greater than Minimum 
Victim Harm 
Maximum Offender Gain 
Less than Minimum 
Victim Harm 
High Transaction 
Costs 
Internalization of Harm 
(Liability Rule) 
 
 
Complete Deterrence  
(Type 2 Property Rule) 
Low Transaction 
Costs 
Complete Deterrence 
(Type 1 Property Rule) 
 
 
Complete Deterrence 
(Type 1 Property Rule) 
 
Table 2: Deterrence Policy Categories 
 
As a positive theory of criminal law, this modern synthesis works well. Most crimes fall 
under the three cells labeled “complete deterrence” in the diagram above. The 
“internalization” cell captures transactions that fall under tort law generally. The tort-
crime boundary is well explained by the boundary in the diagram between the first cell 
and the remaining three cells. 
Kaplow and Shavell (1996) show that this modern synthesis breaks down in a zero 
transaction cost environment. If transaction costs are zero, then efficient transactions will 
occur whether the underlying legal rule is a property rule (complete deterrence) or a 
liability rule (internalization). This is an implication of the Coase Theorem. However, 
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there are two reasons the modern synthesis remains valid in spite of the Kaplow-Shavell 
proposition. First, zero-transaction cost environments are almost never realized. Some 
sources of transaction costs, such as self-defense, are primitive,28 in the sense that they 
are hard-wired by evolution into human behavior. The existence of such primitive 
transaction costs limits the Coase Theorem’s applicability. Second, even in the zero-
transaction costs scenario, the seemingly efficient takings of property that would occur 
under a liability rule would still fail the efficiency test in the longer term.29  People make 
investments in reliance on property rights and entitlements protected by law generally.  
To the extent efficient takings deny individuals a profitable return on their investments, 
such conduct would diminish society’s wealth in the long term. 
 
Implications for Law 
 
Substantive criminal law consists of doctrinal rules, such as the requirement of criminal 
intent and defenses such as the necessity doctrine. These rules fit well within the 
synthesis explained so far. 
 
Criminal Intent 
  
Consider the law on criminal intent. Under the framework elaborated here, intent doctrine 
serves to distinguish cases where the complete deterrence policy is appropriate from 
those where the internalization policy is appropriate. The complete deterrence policy is 
appropriate where transaction costs are low and the offender has taken an action that 
imposes a substantial harm on the victim, with the intention to impose the harm. Recall, 
that I referred to this as a Type I Property Rule scenario. Complete deterrence is also 
appropriate where the offender’s action are unambiguously socially undesirable, because 
the burden of avoiding the harm is low and the harm is both easily foreseeable and great.  
I referred to this as a Type 2 Property Rule scenario. Under these conditions, the 
offender’s actions reveal an indifference to the victim’s welfare (again, take the case of 
intentionally driving against the direction of highway traffic). 
Criminal law doctrine requires something more of intent in the Type 1 scenario than does 
tort law. Tort law requires only an intent to execute the act, while knowing with 
substantial certainty that a harmful contact will occur (Hylton, 2016). Criminal law, on 
the other hand, requires, in addition to this level of intent, evidence that the actor intended 
to impose a substantial harm on the victim. A concrete illustration is Vosburg v. Putney 
(50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891)), where the defendant kicked the plaintiff to get his attention 
                                                 
28 Hylton (2018b). 
29 Id. 
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while in school. The court found that the kick satisfied the level of intent required by tort 
law, but also held that the evidence need not show an intention to impose a substantial 
harm as would be required under criminal law. The slight kick given by Putney to 
Vosburg was enough to satisfy the tort standard of intentionality but probably not enough 
to satisfy the criminal law intent standard. 
The tort law intent standard facilitates the optimal internalization of harm.30  It guarantees 
that tortfeasors will bear the costs of their intentional conduct, and therefore choose to 
take an action that is potentially harmful (in the sense of being undesired) to another only 
when the perceived private benefit of doing so is greater. The criminal law intent 
standard, by contrast, ensures that courts apply the complete deterrence policy to the 
appropriate instances. The complete deterrence policy requires a sanction sufficient to 
remove the gain, and possibly greater. Such a policy would enable a court to impose a 
sanction more severe than the level required for internalization of harm. 
Regina v. Smith (David) (1 Q.B. 354 (1974)) illustrates the function of the intent standard 
in criminal law. The defendant had installed electrical wiring, roofing, wall panels, and 
floorboards in the apartment he rented, with the landlord’s permission. Under the law, 
these minor additions became the property of the landlord. When the defendant decided 
to leave the apartment he asked the landlord if his brother, who had been living with him, 
could remain as the tenant. The landlord refused, and the defendant damaged the roofing, 
wall panels, and floor boards in the course of taking out the electrical wiring he had 
installed. The defendant argued as a justification that he thought he was damaging his 
own property. A conviction by the trial court was overturned on appeal. The appellate 
court held that the defendant’s actions did not indicate the type of intent to impose harm 
required by criminal law. The defendant’s actions clearly revealed the type of intent 
required by tort law, but not the type required by criminal law. 
Certainly if the defendant in Regina v. Smith had walked into the landlord’s building and 
damaged the roofing in an act of vandalism, the intent standard required by criminal law 
would have been satisfied. In that case, the defendant would have imposed a substantial 
harm with the intention to do so. In addition, the defendant would have had the option, in 
this hypothetical scenario, to bargain with the landlord for the right to vandalize. Because 
a harm would have been imposed, for the sole purpose of doing so, in a setting where the 
actor could have arranged a consensual transaction, a Type 1 Property Rule violation 
would have occurred. The court’s decision shows that courts distinguish the case of 
imposition of harm with the pure intention to do so from instances where harm is 
imposed in connection with some other, perhaps legitimate, motivation. These cases are 
not Type 1 Property Rule violations because they lack the intention to harm. Because of 
the absence of an intention to harm as the sole motivating factor the complete deterrence 
policy should not apply. Although the defendant’s actions in Regina v. Smith violated tort 
                                                 
30 Hylton (2010). 
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law, and would justify a judgment for damages in favor of the landlord, the actions 
coupled with the intention would not justify criminal punishment.  
The case for an insanity defense in criminal law, though not in tort law, follows directly 
from this reasoning. Given that the intention to impose harm is an important element of 
the Type 1 Property Rule violation, evidence that the defendant was insane would 
undermine the inference that he had an intention to impose a substantial harm.31 On the 
other hand, the mere intention to execute the act leading to the harm would be sufficient 
to justify the internalization policy effected through tort law.32 Consequently, insanity is 
not recognized as a defense in tort law, except in rare cases where the insanity prevents 
the actor from meeting the basic intention-to-execute standard.33 
The self-defense justification also follows from the foregoing discussion. A person who 
harms an assailant in self-defense clearly does not have the intent to harm required under 
the criminal law, and necessary for triggering the complete deterrence policy. Surely, if 
the defendant in Regina v. Smith did not have the intent required by criminal law, then an 
individual who acts in self-defense does not meet the intent standard too. Of course, if the 
person who acts in self-defense does so with excessive force, or in situations where there 
is no reasonable basis for perceiving a need to act in self-defense, then the self-defense 
justification is invalid. In all of these cases, the inference of intent to commit a Type 1 
Property Rule violation follows from the acts committed by the defendant. 
Regina v. Cunningham (2 Q.B. 396 (1957)) illustrates the function of the intent standard 
in the Type 2 Property Rule context. The defendant went to the basement of 7A Bakes 
Street, which was being rented by his prospective mother-in-law, though it was at the 
time unoccupied, and tore the gas meter off the wall, causing coal gas to escape from the 
connecting pipe. 7A Bakes Street was separated from the house next door in which the 
victim lived only by a porous wall of loosely cemented rubble. The two houses had 
originally been one. The gas seeped through the wall, nearly killing Mrs. Wade, the 
tenant next door. The defendant claimed that he tore the meter off the wall to get money 
from the meter. The court overturned the defendant’s conviction for reckless 
endangerment because the jury had not been instructed to consider whether the defendant 
had foreseen that removal of the meter might injure someone. 
Conduct that is reckless under tort law is often reckless under criminal law as well. 
However, courts should, under the economic framework, be more observant of the intent 
requirement in the criminal law setting. Regina v. Cunningham indicates that the criminal 
law requires strong evidence that the defendant acted with indifference toward the 
welfare of the victim, which requires evidence of knowledge of the danger and of 
knowledge of a foreseeable victim. The tort standard for recklessness is formally the 
                                                 
31 Posner (1985) justifies the insanity on the ground that insane actors are not deterrable.  This approach is 
over inclusive.  Deterrability is not the sole basis for determining the scope of criminal law doctrines, 
otherwise tort law would mirror criminal law. 
32 Hylton (2016). 
33 Id. 
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same, though Cunningham suggests that criminal law courts are more demanding on 
evidence supporting the inference of intent (indifference to harm).  
The foregoing doctrines of criminal law are not entirely consistent with the theory that 
intent is just an index of the probability of harm.34 In Regina v. Smith, the harm to the 
landlord may have been the same whether the defendant thought he was recapturing his 
own property or not. 
 
Necessity 
 
The necessity defense in criminal (and in tort law) is an implication of this model. Under 
the defense, a defendant may be excused if his actions imposed a harm in order to avoid a 
much greater harm. These are cases where the costs of arranging a consensual transaction 
are high, typically because of an emergency setting and because the victim would be 
unlikely to give his consent anyway. In addition, the social gain from the defendant’s 
conduct is positive. These two features put the necessity cases within the first cell of 
Table 1, under the internalization policy. 
United States v. Holmes (26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C. Penn. 1842)) illustrates the function (or 
non-function) of criminal law in the necessity settings. After a shipwreck, Holmes, the 
captain, and his crew found themselves in a lifeboat with surviving passengers. Finding 
that the lifeboat was too small to carry the passengers and crew to safety, Holmes and his 
crew decided to throw some passengers (unmarried males) off the boat to ensure the 
safety of the remaining passengers. When the party made it to shore, Holmes was charged 
with murder. 
At first glance, the necessity defense would appear to be appropriate in Holmes. The 
defendants were able to save a greater number of lives by jettisoning some passengers.  
However, the court rejected the necessity defense because of the procedure that Holmes 
had adopted in determining the unlucky passengers to jettison. The court held that 
Holmes should have, to take advantage of the necessity defense, first determined the 
minimum number of crew members necessary to maintain the lifeboat before turning 
toward passengers to jettison, a procedure which Holmes had not followed. The 
procedural rule required by the court is itself economically reasonable, because it would 
dampen the moral hazard that would arise if ship captains could assume that passengers 
would be sacrificed before crew. 
 
                                                 
34 An approach that starts with the optimal sanction and then works backward to determine whether 
criminal law doctrines are consistent with the optimal sanction would suggest that intent is for the most part 
an index of the probability of harm; see Holmes (1881), Becker (1968), Shavell (1985).  This is an 
appropriate starting point, but intent doctrine serves other functions as well. 
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Holmes does not reject the principle of necessity. The decision merely limits the scope of 
the defense in order to mitigate moral hazard that might generate more mass accidents in 
which the sacrifice of some victims may be necessary to save a larger number of victims. 
 
Public versus Private Enforcement 
 
The choice between public and private enforcement of law is closely related to this 
essay,35 but it is largely a question of procedure rather than substance. The criminal law 
consists of rules applying criminal sanctions to specific conduct. The determination of 
whether law enforcement is carried out by the state exclusively or through the efforts of 
private individuals is a different matter, and could be answered in any manner under the 
same set of substantive law rules. Modern criminal law is a matter of public enforcement.  
In the past, criminal law was privately enforced for the most part.36 
Comparative advantage explains most of the observed allocation of enforcement effort 
between public and private actors.37 Victims have an advantage in the ordinary cases of 
knowing who the offender is.38 For this reason, tort law is often sufficient as a law 
enforcement mechanism. However, there are many scenarios where victims either do not 
know who the offender is, or, knowing the offender, are unlikely to pursue an 
enforcement action. Public enforcement is necessary in these cases. 
The contribution of this model to the enforcement allocation question comes from its 
derivation of a boundary between areas of complete deterrence and of internalization.  
The state has an advantage over victims in carrying out the complete deterrence policy.39  
The state can credibly threaten to enjoin or to punish in instances where private 
individuals could not. Enjoining or preventing the completion of a criminal act will often 
require investigation and the collection of information. Few private individuals would 
have an incentive to do so, especially given that the benefit of such effort would go 
mainly to other potential victims. Moreover, the most harmful offenders would threaten 
to retaliate against any private individual who attempted to enforce the law against them.  
Few private individuals would risk their own safety to pursue an enforcement action 
against an offender who threatens harm to the general public. 
Conversely, private litigation has an advantage under the internalization policy.40  
Victims will often know the identity of the offender, and will especially have an 
advantage in determining the harms they have suffered. Victims will be in the best 
                                                 
35 Polinsky and Shavell (2000). 
36 See, e.g., Landes and Posner (1975, at 2), Grannuci (1969). 
37 Steven Shavell (1993). 
38 Id. 
39 Hylton (2018a) 
40 Id. 
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position, relative to state actors, to inform courts of the harm, and to aid courts in 
designing remedies that internalize the harm suffered by victims.   
 
Public Choice  
 
The public choice literature becomes relevant as soon as one examines the incentives of 
actors under public enforcement. However, the public choice literature has important 
implications for criminal procedure, more so than substantive criminal law (Hylton and 
Khanna, 2007; Hylton 2018). The procedural implications matter for the deterrence 
question. 
The complete deterrence policy requires the elimination of any prospective gain from the 
commission of an offense. There are many forms of punishment that could be used to 
accomplish this purpose. The most common form today, imprisonment, would not 
necessarily be the most obvious choice of punishment if society were to begin with a 
clean slate. Incarceration provides an incapacitation benefit to society, by ensuring that 
the criminal offender cannot offend again (at least against non-incarcerated people) while 
in prison. The deterrence value of prison, however, is somewhat uncertain, given the 
presumably heavy discounting of the future among the population of criminals. 
Moreover, imprisonment is costly to society – both in the direct costs of maintaining the 
incarcerated and in the indirect (opportunity) costs of their forgone labor. 
The most plausible reason society bears such heavy costs in imprisoning convicted 
criminals is that more efficient forms of punishment would generate greater rent seeking 
in the enforcement process (Friedman, 1999). For example, a general property forfeiture 
penalty would incentivize enforcers to pursue violations, both real and imagined, to 
maximize the revenue to enforcers from forfeitures. The inefficient punishment system 
that exists today appears to be suboptimal at first glance, but it would be difficult to 
design a different punishment system that would not have substantial inefficiencies as 
well. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Much of substantive criminal law can be justified using economic analysis.  It appears to 
be true that criminals are not easy to deter by the threat of punishment, probably because 
many of them tend to discount the future heavily.  At the same, however, there is a vast 
population of non-criminals that includes many who are in fact deterred from harming 
others by the criminal law.  In any event, the focus on punishment is mostly of tangential 
relevance in examining the economics of criminal law. 
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Substantive criminal law consists of rules assigning criminal punishment to an assortment 
of acts. The rules assign certain areas of offensive conduct to tort law and others to 
criminal law, and within criminal law exempt some types of offensive conduct from 
punishment. These assignments across tort and criminal law boundaries, and within 
criminal law itself appear to be consistent with the aim of providing incentives to 
minimize the costs of harm and harm avoidance. The moral injunction against harming 
others fails to explain many of these patterns. Take, for example, the necessity defense, 
which fits easily within an economic framework, but is unjustifiable on moral grounds. 
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